Battle of Wilson's Creek
Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon, after declaring war in his meeting with Frank Blair, Governor Jackson, and Major General Price, returned to the Arsenal and called a staff meeting of all his commanders of volunteer regiments. Lyon had already drawn his strategic plan. The task that lay before him was execution of that plan.
The plan consisted of two major troop movements. Anticipating the reactions of the enemy, Lyon hoped that his two forces could trap the enemy in a pincer movement. The southern arm of the pincer, which would include Henry and Philip Landwehr, will be referred to as the Southwestern Column. It would be moved into place by sending troops into the southwestern part of the State to minimize movement of Confederate troops into Missouri, and to block the shipments of arms into the State from Arkansas. The positioning of the Southwestern Column would also serve a second purpose. It would prevent Missouri rebels from moving south to join Southern troops in Arkansas.
The northern arm of Lyon's pincer movement would be called Lyon's Army of the West. Lyon did not believe that the Missouri State Guard would be able to defend Jefferson City, and questioned whether they would even make an attempt. On the basis of that assumption, Lyon planned for his Army of the West to move west from St. Louis toward Kansas. It would push the rebel forces west out of Jefferson City, and gain control of the Missouri River. The strongly secessionist counties of northern Missouri were meeting with great success in recruiting State Guard companies. Control of the river by Lyon's forces would prevent movement of these companies to the south to join other Confederate troops and sympathizers.
Lyon anticipated that the State forces fleeing west from Jefferson City would eventually turn south. Lyon's Army of the West would pursue them, and trap them in the pincer movement when their southern progress was blocked by the Southwestern Column, which would be waiting south of the Osage River.
The Southwestern Column would include both Volunteers and Home Guards, and was to be commanded by Brigadier General Thomas W. Sweeny. The Column, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, would travel to Rolla by rail, and then to Springfield by road. The first contingent of that column--part of Colonel Francis Sigel's Third Regiment Volunteers--left St. Louis by train that same afternoon (June 11, 1861).
Colonel Sigel was to play an important role in the following few months, and Henry and Philip Landwehr would serve under his command. A small man, now thirty-seven years of age, he had served as Commanding Officer of the German state of Baden in a revolt in 1848. Prior to his service in the Civil War, he was the principal of the German Institute of St. Louis. Although the success of his commands would be inconsistent, he would be a Major General by the end of the war.
Two days after the first contingent left St. Louis, Sigel and the balance of his Third Regiment Volunteers departed by rail for Rolla, accompanied by the guns and caissons of Major Bischoff's six-gun light artillery. On the same day, Lyon departed from St. Louis with a force of about 2,000 men. Carried by four steamboats, the Army of the West proceeded north on the Mississippi to the mouth of the Missouri, and then started up the Missouri River toward Jefferson City.
Two days later, on the 15th, Henry and Philip Landwehr were among the last contingent of the Southwestern Column, as they climbed aboard the train that would take them to Rolla. They were under the command of Colonel Charles E. Salomon. His command included his own Fifth Regiment Volunteers (about 925 men, including Henry and Philip), as well as two regiments of the Home Guards (about 2,000 men). The Home Guards would be assigned the task of patrolling the railroad, and maintaining the safety of the road between Rolla and Springfield against guerrilla attack.
Brigadier General Thomas Sweeny, who was to command the entire Southwestern Column, did not leave St. Louis with his troops. In fact, he would not leave for another two weeks. During those two weeks, Sweeny would work to solve the tremendous logistical problems that faced both Lyon's Army of the West and the Southwestern Column. The Army of the West was traveling light, to enable them to pursue the State troops. Therefore, new provisions would have to be available when they reached Springfield. Once the mountain of supplies that would be needed was collected, the rail line would provide a relatively easy way to transport them to Rolla. But from Rolla to Springfield, it would be a different story. In Rebellion in Missouri: 1861, Hans Christian Adamson describes the situation:
"...the 120-mile stretch between the end of rail at Rolla and the thriving city of Springfield was not worthy of being called a road. It was, rather, a worn, rutty, and rocky trail where horses had to lean hard into their collars to make the wagons roll; where teamsters, time and again, had to lighten loads in order to raise their wheels out of hub-deep depressions."
Brigadier General Sweeny had been advised that the teamsters, wagons, mules, and oxen or heavy draft horses he would need for transport would not be available in either Rolla or Springfield. They would also have to come from St. Louis. Sweeny succeeded in making all of the necessary arrangements before leaving St. Louis for Springfield in late June.
On the same day that Henry and Philip Landwehr left St. Louis by rail, Lyon and his army reached Jefferson City, which they quickly occupied without incident. He had accomplished his first goal without firing a shot. He had chased the State Government out of its capital, forced it into exile, and deprived it of its power to function.
As soon as he arrived in Jefferson City, Lyon received information that armed rebels were preparing fortifications at Boonville, fifty miles upstream. Two days later, on June 17, Lyon and his Army of the West clashed with the Missouri State Guards, commanded by Governor Jackson, at Boonville. The battle was the first real fighting of the Civil War in Missouri. The Union troops routed Jackson's State Guards, and thereby gained control of northern Missouri. From that hour on, the Missouri was a Union river. Governor Jackson first retreated to Tipton, about twenty miles south of Boonville, and then to Warsaw, about forty miles further southwest.
Meanwhile, Missouri State Guard units were recruiting at Lexington, further upstream, and not far east of Kansas City. This recruiting operation was being conducted under the command of Major General Price. When Price received the news that Governor Jackson had retreated toward Warsaw, he left orders for his command to retreat to Lamar, in southwest Missouri, where they would link up with Governor Jackson's forces. Price left at once with his staff and a small escort for Arkansas, in hopes of obtaining assistance from either the Arkansas Governor, or Confederate Brigadier General Ben McCulloch.
Adamson describes Price's ride south from Boonville:
"Paul Revere never rode faster nor shouted his tidings of alarm louder, than did portly "Pap" Price on his long ride from Boonville to Cowskin Prairie. The latter was a stretch of grassland in the extreme southwestern corner of Missouri. Maysville, Arkansas, was some score miles to the south. The nearest city, thriving Neosho, was Newton County's seat.
Price left Lexington with a small escort. By some magic means, seemingly by prairie wireless, the countryside ahead of Price's line of travel heard about his coming. By the pair, by the dozen, by the company--by the hundreds--mounted men joined his informal cavalcade... By the time Price reached Cowskin Prairie, his force amounted to about 1,200 horsemen. The hundreds of eager but horseless men along his route who wanted to fight under the colors of Missouri were informed that Governor Jackson and his generals would soon come marching along. They were warmly invited to join the infantry and to spread the word as far as they could."
Meanwhile, Colonel Sigel was the first of Lyon's officers to arrive in Springfield, on June 23. After organizing his command as rapidly as he could, Sigel headed toward Neosho with his Third Volunteers. Neosho was a hotbed of secessionism, located about sixty miles west-southwest of Springfield, and was the spot that Lyon had selected for the Southwestern Column to wait for Governor Jackson as he fled south, closely pursued by Lyon and his Army of the West.
Colonel Salomon's command, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, reached Springfield on June 27, four days after Colonel Sigel. In the twelve days since they had left St. Louis, they had traveled by rail to Rolla, and then marched to Springfield. Soon after reaching Springfield, Colonel Salomon pushed on west to Neosho, where he joined Colonel Sigel and his men. Sigel informed Salomon that Major General Price and his cavalcade had passed to the south several days earlier. Sigel and Salomon had two choices: they could wait in Neosho, or they could move their forces north, and help Lyon close the pincers on Governor Jackson and his army wherever they met them. Their decision to push north is generally accepted to have been a wise decision, as it would permit the Federal forces to engage Governor Jackson and the State Guards further from the help that might be provided by Confederate forces in northwest Arkansas. Sigel assumed command of the expedition by virtue of his greater military experience.
Meanwhile, Governor Jackson had consolidated the State Guard forces. On July 3, the same day Colonel Sigel and Colonel Salomon started north from Neosho, Governor Jackson and his State Guards camped three miles north of Lamar, and twenty miles north of Carthage. The march south had been accomplished under very difficult conditions, but Jackson was concerned that Lyon would catch up with him before he could link up with Sterling Price and his troops. At roll call on July 3, Jackson's forces consisted of about 2,660 infantry, 1,400 cavalry, and two batteries of artillery. In addition, there were about 2,000 unarmed and unequipped horsemen in camp.
Late in the afternoon of July 4, Sigel's Southwestern Column camped just south of Carthage, only twenty miles south of Governor Jackson's forces. Sigel's troops, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, had just completed a hot and difficult twenty-mile march. As tents were being pitched, and cooking fires lit, Sigel received word that his scouts had encountered some of Governor Jackson's State Guards, who were foraging in Carthage. As soon as their men had eaten, the Southwestern Column moved forward and took possession of Carthage. Sigel and Salomon hoped to march north and catch Governor Jackson off guard early the next morning.
When Governor Jackson first heard that a patrol of Federal troops was approaching Carthage from the south, neither he nor his generals could believe the news. They were concerned about Lyon, who was somewhere behind them, but had no idea that there were any Federal troops to the south. After discussing the situation, a decision was made to march on Carthage at sunrise the next morning.
That night, Henry and Philip Landwehr and their comrades slept on their arms. They were awakened before sunrise the next morning, and fell into ranks without breakfast. Colonel Sigel soon learned that Governor Jackson was marching south from Lamar with 4,000 troops, outnumbering the 1,000 Federal troops four to one. Sigel did not hesitate. Soon after sunrise, the Southwestern Column began marching north to meet Governor Jackson's forces. They had marched nine miles when they sighted Governor Jackson's mounted riflemen and infantry. The balance of Jackson's forces stood in battle formation on the top of a distant ridge.
Governor Jackson's troops watched as Sigel's troops, with their six cannon, forded the Coon Creek, and moved toward them. After crossing the creek, the Federal infantry was deployed into the woods on both the left and right flanks of the artillery. Henry and Philip Landwehr were on the right flank, which was tipped by a six-pounder piece. Adamson describes what happened next:
"As the infantry emerged from the brush, on both sides of the forward moving artillery, it formed into line of battle at a distance of about 1,200 yards from the enemy. Slowly up the slope came the puffy-eyed and sweating Germans. Even this early in the morning, the day was hot for an uphill climb under full combat pack. Suddenly, at 900 yards, there were shouted commands. Bischoff's cannon were swung into line, the Federal infantry (including Henry and Philip Landwehr) slung itself prone on the ground. Then the silence of the morning and the small sounds of the prairie were shattered and drowned out by the short, harsh bark of artillery. The Federals began the firing. The State Guard gave ready answer."
Thirty years later, in his application for a soldier's pension, Henry Landwehr would recall that hot July day near Carthage, and state that:
"he from exposure in camp on guard duty & on the march in extremely hot weather suffered much for want of proper food & water, over-exertion in battles of Carthage & Wilson's Creek, Mo..."
Henry and Philip and their comrades in the infantry watched for nearly an hour, as the artillery battle continued. Sigel then became suspicious that Governor Jackson's troops had begun an encircling movement, and decided to retreat. The long days of drills in the Arsenal at St. Louis paid dividends, as the retreat was well-planned and well-executed, with artillery cover provided to the infantry as they withdrew. Federal casualties were thirteen killed, and thirty-one wounded. Missouri State Guard casualties were ten killed, and sixty-four wounded.
Adamson comments on the Federal tactics at the Battle of Carthage:
"Just why Sigel and Salomon undertook to charge up a hill against Jackson and such overwhelming numerical odds has never been explained. They were inferior in gunpower as well as rifle fire and they lacked the highly essential element of cavalry. It could, of course, be that they made the grave error of under-estimating the natural fighting instinct of Missourians. Their own soldiers may have been better trained, but the weight of numbers--rolling down hill--gave Jackson a clear-cut advantage and he made the most of it."
Henry and Philip and their comrades retreated to Carthage. After a pause of several hours, they marched east to Sarcoxie, arriving there at four o'clock in the morning. In the last twenty-four hours, they had not only tangled with the State Guard--they had also marched thirty-four miles without anything to eat. From Sarcoxie, they marched to Mount Vernon, and finally back to Springfield. With Sigel's defeat at Carthage, Lyon's plan to trap Governor Jackson's forces in a pincer movement had failed.
As it turned out, Governor Jackson need not have been concerned that Lyon and his Army of the West would catch up with Jackson's Missouri State Guards. The task of assembling a transport train to accompany his army south proved to be much more difficult than Lyon and his officers had anticipated. Sixteen days passed from the day that Lyon took Boonville until his army left Boonville to march south. Lyon's army finally left Boonville just two days before the Battle of Carthage.
After a difficult ten-day march, Lyon and his troops reached Springfield, a bustling boomtown of 2,000 souls, on July 13. There, the Army of the West and the Southwestern Column were reunited. But, soon after his arrival, Lyon learned of a serious logistical problem. Lyon expected to find mountains of supplies, including weapons, ammunition, clothing, and food, awaiting him in Springfield. Some of the supplies had reached Rolla, but none had been transported to Springfield. Lyon could not have anticipated the actions of a petty Quartermaster in St. Louis. Jealous of Lyon's rapid rise to command, the Quartermaster cancelled all of the supply arrangements that Brigadier General Sweeny had made, as soon as Sweeny left St. Louis. Acting our of sheer malice toward Lyon, the Quartermaster endangered the entire Federal expedition.
As Lyon analyzed his troop strength, he found that his entire command, not including Home Guards, numbered only about 6,000 potential effectives. In addition, he commanded about 1,200 Home Guards in Springfield and vicinity, who were being organized and armed. On the other hand, reports reaching Lyon indicated that Major General Price's enemy troop strength had rapidly grown to 30,000. And if that weren't enough, Lyon received rumors that Governor Jackson was making arrangements for help from Confederate armies in Tennessee and Arkansas.
The outlook appeared bleak. Lyon needed to strike at the Missouri forces before they were able to train and equip all their new recruits. But the lack of supplies, particularly shoes, prevented an early offensive by Lyon.
Lyon was also faced with another problem. Henry and Philip Landwehr, and all of the other Volunteers and Home Guards who responded to President Lincoln's April proclamation, were only enlisted for ninety days. Most of Lyon's troops enlisted during late April and early May. In another week or two, their ninety-day enlistment periods would begin to expire. While the Army could accept volunteers who sought to re-enlist of their own free will, no soldier could be prevented from going home after his three months were up. Unless something could be done, Lyon's troop strength by the end of July would be reduced to three regiments of Volunteer infantry and artillery, plus about 1,000 regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
Adamson describes Lyon's approach to the problem:
"All company officers were urged to familiarize themselves with the attitudes of the men within their respective companies as regards further service and to urge them to re-enlist. When asked to state their views, the great majority of captains and lieutenants who spoke up declared that the men could take hunger and hardship in their stride. But waves of disappointemnt had swept over the organizations when they found that neither clothing replacements, provisions, nor pay awaited them in Springfield. None of them had seen the color of Uncle Sam's money since the very day they put on uniforms."
The troops of Lyon's Army of the West were exhausted from their difficult march from Boonville, as were those animals of his transport train which survived the journey. Nevertheless, Lyon ordered that a wagon train be assembled to leave as early as possible for Rolla, and to return with as heavy a load of supplies as the animals could haul.
According to Adamson, Nathaniel Lyon sent the following message that same afternoon to the Adjutant General in St. Louis:
"All idea of any further movement, or even maintaining our present position, must soon be abandoned unless the Government furnishes us promptly with large reinforcements and supplies.
Our troops are badly clothed, poorly fed and imperfectly supplied with tents. None of them have as yet been paid and three months volunteers have become disheartened to such an extent that very few of them are willing to renew their enlistments."
Lyon felt that his only chance was to obtain reinforcements before the end of the month, so that he could attack Price at Cowskin Prairie during the last week of July, before he lost too many of his troops due to expiration of their ninety-day enlistments.
During the next three weeks, Lyon's forces would remain encamped at Springfield, waiting for the supplies and reinforcements they desperately needed. He also had to fight a War Department that wanted him to send his Regular infantry and cavalry back to Washington.
While Lyon waited, more bad news arrived. Adamson describes the news and the results:
"Then, on July 26, came the paralyzing news of the overwhelming Confederate victory in the Battle of Bull Run. In pro-Southern states, jubilation ran high and served as a builder of confidence. Southwestern Missouri, with its growing rural population, was held together by strong Southern ties. The rural counties shook with surges of rambunctious and vociferous enthusiasm. Men and boys, who until now had been uncertain about joining up, flocked to Cowskin Prairie to get into the fray, join the Dutch hunt, and kill themselves a few Yankees while the going was good. Everybody knew that this was going to be a short war. Price became more audacious. Heavily armed foraging parties would come within a few miles of Springfield, raid Unionist farms, burn homes, barns, and smokehouses."
On the same day that news of the Battle of Bull Run was received by Lyon, Major General John Charles Fremont arrived in St. Louis to take command of the new Western Department. Unfortunately, Fremont was a poor choice for the command, and he virtually ignored Lyon's pleas for assistance, as he gave his attention to other matters.
Meanwhile, Major General Price was successfully training and equipping his rebel army at Cowskin Prairie. They struck camp on July 24, and arrived in Cassville, fifty miles southwest of Springfield, three days later. There, they were joined by another 650 State Guard troops, and by 5,000 well-armed Confederate troops. The rebel armies at Cassville now numbered 12,000, plus another 2,000 unarmed Missourians.
Price and the other commanders of the rebel army were now ready to attack Lyon, and began their march on Springfield on August 1. Lyon soon learned that the enemy was approaching, but was in a poor position to react. He was continuing to lose men as their ninety-day enlistments expired, he had received no reinforcements from St. Louis, and the wagon train of supplies had not yet returned from Rolla. Because of inadequate food, many of his troops were wasting from privation. They needed clothes, and large numbers of them were entirely without shoes.
Henry and Philip were apparently among the troops whose enlistment expired that day. In his later report of the upcoming Battle of Wilson's Creek, Colonel Sigel wrote:
"The time of service of the Fifth Regiment Missouri Volunteers had expired before the battle. I had induced them, company by company, not to leave us in the most critical and dangerous moment, and had engaged them for the time of eight days, this term ending on Friday, the 9th, the day before the battle."
Thus, Henry and Philip Landwehr agreed to stay for the upcoming battle.
Lyon and his officers knew that Springfield could not be defended. They felt they could scrape together three days of field rations. They decided to gamble, and engage the enemy within two days march of Springfield. That same day, on August 1, they moved their army, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, twelve miles south of Springfield, to the point where Terrell Creek empties into Wilson's Creek.
On the 2nd and 3rd of August, there were skirmishes between units of the opposing armies near Dug Springs, but no major battles. Price's forces could not mount a full-scale attack on Lyon because of disputes over command of the Missouri, Arkansas, and Confederate armies. By the time that their differences were resolved, and they began to move their 15,000 troops against Lyon's 5,000 troops early on August 5, they discovered that Lyon had fallen back to Springfield. The rebel forces, now under the command of Brigadier General Ben McCulloch, camped that night on Wilson's Creek, south of Springfield.
On his return to Springfield, Lyon received both bad news and good news. There was still no reason to be optimistic that Fremont would provide replacements. But, the wagon train had finally returned from Rolla, with food, clothing, and shoes. Distribution of the supplies did wonders for the fighting spirit of the troops.
On the afternoon of August 8, Lyon called his officers together to discuss their next move. There was agreement that Springfield could not be defended. They could not stay there and wait for the enemy to attack. There was strong support for a retreat to Rolla. But there was concern that the enemy could easily turn such a retreat into a rout. The only other alternative was to attack.
The next day, on August 9, Lyon made his decision. They would attack the enemy, and hopefully inflict enough damage to prevent the enemy from disrupting a subsequent retreat to Rolla. Plans were made to march on the enemy that night, and to attack at dawn the next morning. As plans were being made, Sigel proposed that he take his brigade, consisting of infantry (including Henry and Philip), cavalry, and six pieces of artillery, south of the enemy camp, while Lyon's main force would attack from the north.
Sigel's proposal was opposed, and was not adopted, but Sigel met with Lyon again later in the morning, and Sigel's proposal was incorporated into the battle plan. Colonel Sigel would move his 1,200 troops, who would be known as the South Column, at six o'clock that evening. He was to time his arrival at Wilson's Creek so that he would round the enemy's right flank at daylight, and be in a position to attack when Lyon began his attack from the north. The North Column, consisting of 3,600 men commanded by Lyon, would march westward during the night, reach and round the enemy's left flank by daybreak, and then launch the attack. They would strike a paralyzing blow against the enemy, then make a speedy withdrawal to Rolla before the enemy could recover enough to prevent their retreat.
Meanwhile, the rebel commanders were also making plans. While their decision-making had been slowed by General McCulloch's lack of confidence in Major General Price's State Guard, a decision had been reached. They would attack Lyon at Springfield on the morning of August 10, the very same time that Lyon was planning to attack McCulloch's forces at Wilson's Creek! But a problem arose at the last minute. The Missouri State Guards had no cartridge boxes. Instead, they carried their cartridges in cotton bags which they hung around their necks. The cotton bags provided little protection against a hard rain, such as the rain which began to fall as they prepared to march. Because their firepower would have been substantially reduced by the effect of the rain, the attack on Lyon's army was postponed.
There are a number of good books which describe the Battle of Wilson's Creek in detail. Adamson's Rebellion in Missouri: 1861 is one. We will not attempt to describe details of the entire battle here, but will summarize the actions which involved Henry and Philip Landwehr.
Adamson describes Sigel's movements as he positioned his troops, including Henry and Philip, for battle:
"Sigel moved out of camp at 6:30 o'clock and headed down the Springfield Road toward Wilson's Creek for a distance of some four miles. The night was dark and it was raining. Presently, however, the downpour died into a drizzle. From the highway, the column swung straight south over open county. The guides, and Captain Carr's First Cavalry company, had the lead. It required great caution for the vanguard not to lose its way or not to get separated from the main body. Carr's orders were to pick up and hold any person they might come upon; this to prevent information from reaching the enemy.
After trudging some five hours over muddy and rain-sodden country, at the end of which both men and animals were approaching exhaustion, the column rested in a glade of trees, protected from the rain. No fires were lit and all sounds were held at a minimum. At 2 o'clock in the morning, the march was resumed. Nothing untoward occurred during the next two hours. In time the column reached, as expected, the wagon road that crossed Wilson's Creek a short distance to the westward.
Signs that they were approaching the enemy camp appeared about 4 o'clock when, in the lingering darkness, foragers were met going into the surrounding country from the camp. Some 40 were captured by Captain Carr's cavalrymen before they could make outcry or flee.
One of the prisoners said that they were expecting reinforcements from Louisiana and that they had mistaken Carr's cavalry for the reinforcements. In the dark of that morning, Federal coats looked gray.
At about 4:30 o'clock, Colonel Sigel took Lieutenant Farrand and his dragoons to the head of the column and placed his two companies of horsemen ahead and on his flanks. Soon Farrand discovered a small party of men and horses in a ravine--evidently pickets. The men saw him, too, mounted their animals and rode off. Farrand did not capture them but he reported with satisfaction that he had cut them off from their camp. The latter was now in full view, slightly ahead, but mainly on the right.
Luckily for Sigel, at this point the road entered the incline of a ravine. Its walls sheltered his troops from sight. As Sigel held his force briefly under this cover, Carr conducted a swift reconnaissance. It revealed that Wilson's Creek was just ahead and that a large force of rebel cavalry--Churchill, Major, Brown, and Greer--was encamped upstream in Sharp's field on the west bank. Carr also reported that a bluff on the east bank overlooked the site and was a natural selection for the emplacement of cannon. Leaving Carr with his cavalry and an infantry support of several companies as their protective shield, two cannon, under Lieutenant Schuetzenbach, were planted near the edge of the bluff. He was ordered not to discharge a shot until he heard Sigel's fire. Then his guns were to hurl several salvos of canister and shell in among the horsemen who were tending to their animals or preparing breakfast. Carr's position was well sheltered by a curtain of tall weeds.
The rest of Sigel's force crossed Wilson's Creek near Dixon's homestead. Following a rough cattle trail through a thickly wooded area, the column halted when scouts reported sighting the rebel cavalry camp through the edge of the trees.
For Sigel, there was now nothing to do but wait until he heard the opening shots of Nathaniel Lyon's attack from the direction of Oak Hill. The first part of his mission had been performed smoothly and without opposition."
Colonel Sigel waited impatiently for the roar of artillery that would signal the attack by Lyon. His troops were near enough to the rebel camp to hear the men and horses, and to smell their cooking fires. As soon as Sigel heard the roar of distant cannon, he unleashed his six cannon on the surprised rebel cavalry camp below. Their aim was poor, and most of the missiles crashed harmlessly in the woods. Nevertheless, the rebel cavalry was routed from their camp. Henry and Philip Landwehr would have been among the infantry that moved into the enemy camp unopposed. Lieutenant Farrand reported the scene as they entered the deserted rebel camp:
"As we passed through it, I saw many dead bodies and quantities of arms of all description lying on the ground. Many of the latter I caused my men to destroy. There were in their camp a wagon load of Maynard rifles, one of regular rifled muskets, and several boxes of U. S. regulation sabers, all new."
Colonel Sigel thought that the cavalrymen he had driven out of the camp had left the battle scene as they sought escape. But the main battle between the rebels and Lyon's forces to the north had blocked their escape route, and they had reorganized for a counterattack. Captain Carr saw the cavalrymen reorganizing from his vantage point on the bluff, and sent word to Sigel, now in the center of the enemy camp. Sigel just had time to prepare his infantry and artillery for an attack, when the cavalry swept down upon them. Sigel's artillery were extremely effective, and with the support of Henry and Philip and the rest of the infantrymen, the attacking cavalry were quickly driven back.
Sigel's troops, now successful for a second time, broke ranks, and started to pillage the enemy's tents, and set out to capture and appropriate his horses. But the looting was soon brought to an abrupt halt by artillery shot and solid shells which began to rain down upon the looters from an Arkansas battery on a nearby bluff. Sigel's men were driven into the woods west of the field.
A wagon road ran in a northerly direction along the field Sigel's troops had just vacated. Sigel learned that it joined the Springfield Road just west of Sharp's farm. His thoughts turned to the most important task assigned to him--cutting off the enemy's escape route to the south. Sigel described his next move:
"Marching forward, on the wagon road, we struck the Springfield Road, making our way through a large number of cattle and horses, until we arrived on an eminence used as a slaughtering place and known as Sharp's farm. On our route, we had taken about 100 prisoners who were scattered all over the camp. At Sharp's place, we met numbers of the enemy's soldiers who were evidently retiring in this direction and, as I suspected that the enemy, on his retreat, would follow in the same direction, I formed the troops across the road, by planting the artillery on the plateau and the two infantry regiments on the right and left across the road, while the cavalry companies, extended on our flanks.
At this time, and after some skirmishing along the front of our line, the firing in the direction of our northwest, which was during an hour's time roaring in succession, had almost ceased. I, thereupon, presumed that the attack of General Lyon had been successful, and that his troops were in pursuit of the enemy, who moved in large numbers toward the south along the ridge of a hill about 700 yards opposite our right."
It was now 8:30, about three hours since Sigel's artillery began shelling the rebel cavalry camp. Henry and Philip Landwehr, along with the rest of Sigel's infantry, were straddling the Springfield Road, waiting for Lyon's victorious troops to come down the road. But Confederate General McCulloch was quickly informed of Sigel's employment of artillery across the Springfield Road, and decided to attack it head-on with a battalion of dismounted First Arkansas Mounted Riflemen, a battalion of Louisiana Infantry, and an artillery battery.
The use of blue and gray material for uniforms of the two armies was not yet established as a standard at this early point in the war. And the Louisiana Infantry regiment approaching Sigel's position wore uniforms of blue gray--very nearly the same color as those of an Iowa regiment who made up part of Lyon's forces. Colonel Sigel describes what happened:
"This was the state of affairs at half-past eight o'clock in the morning, when it was reported to me by Dr. Melchior, and some of our skirmishers, that "Lyon's men were coming up the road."
Lieutenant-Colonel Albert, of the Third, and Colonel Salomon, of the Fifth, notified their regiments not to fire on troops coming in this direction, while I cautioned the artillery in the same manner.
Our troops in this moment expected, with anxiety, the approach of their friends, and were waving the flag, raised as a signal to their comrades, when at once two batteries opened their fire against us, one in front, placed on the Springfield Road, and the other upon the hill (eastern bluff) upon which we had supposed Lyon's forces were in pursuit of the enemy, while a strong column of infantry, supposed to be the Iowa regiment, advanced on the road, up the hill, and attacked our right.
It is impossible for me to describe the confusion and frightful consternation which was occasioned by this important event. The cry, "They (Lyon's troops) are firing against us," spread like wildfire through our ranks; the artillery men, ordered to fire, and directed by myself, could hardly be brought forward to serve their pieces; the infantry would not level their arms until it was too late. The enemy arrived within 10 paces of the muzzles of our cannon, killed the horses, turned the ranks of the infantry and forced them to fly. The troops were throwing themselves into the bushes and by-roads, retreating as well as they could, followed and attacked incessantly by large bodies of Arkansas and Texas Cavalry."
Sigel's infantry and artillerists, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, were routed. At least one of Sigel's officers, 2nd Lieutenant Emile Thomas of Company F, 5th Missouri (the Company of Henry and Philip Landwehr), tried to rally his panic-stricken men. Suddenly, a mounted Confederate battalion cut across the Union line of retreat. For a moment the two commands gazed at each other. Then, according to a man on the scene:
"...came a terrible rattle of musketry, and a great hubbub and confusion in the direction of Sigel's command, which was just around a bend in the road, to our rear.
In a twinkling, men, horses, wagons, guns, all enveloped in a cloud of dust, rushed toward us, and in spite of Lieut. Thomas' utmost efforts, Company F started with all speed down the (Telegraph) road toward the Confederate cavalry. The latter, seeming to think that they were being charged upon, wheeled and got out of the way very quickly!"
Sigel's column was now divided. The Fifth Regiment, which had included Henry and Philip, retreated by way of the Telegraph road, accompanied by Colonel Salomon. The Third Regiment, accompanied by Colonel Sigel, withdrew down the road along which the brigade had approached the Sharp house.
Reports indicate that Salomon's Fifth Regiment reached the Little York road, and returned to Springfield without further incident. Sigel was not so lucky. He, with about 400 men and one gun, were overtaken and attacked at the James River. Sigel's men scattered into the surrounding woods, and a running fight ensued. Before it was over, the Southerners had killed, captured, or wounded the greater part of Sigel's command. A southern Colonel reported killing 64 and capturing 147 of Sigel's men.
Philip Landwehr was among those fortunate troops who escaped without serious injury. Henry was not so fortunate. He was captured, and taken prisoner, by the Confederate troops. A family story recalled by Everett Bromelsick, a grandson of Henry's brother William, suggests that Henry was taken prisoner along with six of his comrades. It must have been a fearful experience. Henry would not have known any English, so couldn't have communicated with his captors, but would certainly have been aware of how strongly the enemy hated the "damned Dutch".
With Sigel's threat to the rear eliminated, General McCulloch was able to concentrate his troops and artillery against Lyon's main force. The battle raged on for most of the morning. It was hard-fought, at close range, with the hardest fighting in the Battle of Bloody Hill. General Lyon, considered by many historians as destined for greatness, died in battle at mid-morning. The battle finally ended about 11:30. Both sides claimed victory, and both paid a dear price. The casualty rate would be the highest of any major battle in the bloody Civil War.
While the battle between Lyon's column and the rebel armies raged on, Sigel's troops concentrated on avoiding the enemy, and making their way back to Springfield, twelve miles to the north. Colonel Sigel escaped the attack that completed the rout of his command, although he and a companion were chased on horseback for six miles by Confederate horsemen. Sigel and his companion arrived back in Springfield about 4:30 in the afternoon. Sigel's men would continue to straggle into camp throughout the day, and into the night. Of the 1,123 men under Sigel's command that day, an official report listed 35 killed, 132 wounded, and 130 missing. Confederate soldiers would later gather around campfires in the evening and sing of the Battle of Wilson's Creek:
Old Sigel fought some on that day,
But lost his army in the fray;
Then off to Springfield he did run,
With two Dutch guards, and nary gun.
When Philip applied for a military pension thirty years later, one of his affidavits touched on the events of August 10. His affidavit was apparently in reply to a question from the War Department regarding an injury he claimed he had suffered to his forehead. Philip's affidavit stated:
"That he (Philip) can not furnish the affidavits of two persons who wher pressent, at the time of his injury in forehead at the Battle of Wilson Creek Mo on the 10th day of August 1861 for following reason and circumstances. that when he was ordered on a double quick march down a rockey hill in said battle and fell with his head, on a sharp rock his Company where all scatered and no one saw him receive said injury, and when he got to the Company again that night he can not remember, who saw his wound exept four or Five Comrades and they are all dead so he is informed and he says that he had just come from Germany & could not speak the English language..."
It would seem unlikely that Philip was aware of the fate of his older brother. How worried he must have been when he reached camp in Springfield, and found that Henry had not returned! It may have been some time before he learned that Henry was a prisoner of war.
When the returning Federal troops reached Springfield, they found the town in turmoil, as both the streets and the road to Rolla were choked by fleeing citizens. Command of the Federal troops was turned over to Sigel, who was the senior officer in command. One of the Federal officers, Major Schofield, later reported the events that followed:
"On our return to Springfield, at about 5 o'clock p.m., Major Sturgis yielded the command to Colonel Sigel, and the latter, after consultation with many of the officers of the army, decided to retreat toward Rolla; starting at 2 o'clock a.m., in order that the column might be in favorable position for defense before daylight. At the hour appointed for the troops to move I found Colonel Sigel asleep in bed, and his own brigade, which was to be the advance guard, making preparations to cook their breakfast. It was 4 o'clock before I could get them started. Sigel remained in command three days, kept his two regiments in front all the time, made little more than ordinary day's marches, but yet did not get in camp till 10 and one occasion 12 o'clock at night. On the second day he kept the main column waiting, exposed to the sun on a dry prairie, while his own men killed beef and cooked their breakfast. They finished their breakfast at about noon, and then began their day's march.
The fatigue and annoyance to the troops soon became so intolerable that discipline was impossible. The officers, therefore, almost unanimously demanded a change. Major Sturgis, in compliance with the demand, assumed the command."
As Philip made the long, hard march from Springfield back to Rolla, he must have worried about the fate of his brother. Everett Bromelsick's recollection of a family story provides our only information about Henry's captivity. According to the family story, Henry and his comrades were "put in a place no better than a hog pen. All they had to eat were green roasting ears and green apples thrown to them." There are reasons to believe that this description of their treatment was relatively accurate. The rebels, themselves, had little food other than what they could find in the area where they were encamped. Roasting ears were a primary staple of the rebel soldiers who fought at Wilson's Creek. And this description of the treatment given to German soldiers captured by Confederate forces closely matches other documented accounts.
On August 15, five days after the battle, Confederate Brigadier General McCulloch issued a Proclamation to the People of Missouri. In that proclamation, McCulloch announced that "prisoners of the Union party who have been arrested by the army will be released and allowed to return to their friends." Shortly thereafter, Henry Landwehr was parolled (released after signing an oath that he would not again take up arms against the Confederacy), and probably returned to St. Louis with his fellow prisoners.
On August 19, nine days after the battle, Philip Landwehr and the rest of the Army of the West reached Rolla. Philip's regiment arrived in St. Louis two days later, and was mustered out on August 27.
The plan consisted of two major troop movements. Anticipating the reactions of the enemy, Lyon hoped that his two forces could trap the enemy in a pincer movement. The southern arm of the pincer, which would include Henry and Philip Landwehr, will be referred to as the Southwestern Column. It would be moved into place by sending troops into the southwestern part of the State to minimize movement of Confederate troops into Missouri, and to block the shipments of arms into the State from Arkansas. The positioning of the Southwestern Column would also serve a second purpose. It would prevent Missouri rebels from moving south to join Southern troops in Arkansas.
The northern arm of Lyon's pincer movement would be called Lyon's Army of the West. Lyon did not believe that the Missouri State Guard would be able to defend Jefferson City, and questioned whether they would even make an attempt. On the basis of that assumption, Lyon planned for his Army of the West to move west from St. Louis toward Kansas. It would push the rebel forces west out of Jefferson City, and gain control of the Missouri River. The strongly secessionist counties of northern Missouri were meeting with great success in recruiting State Guard companies. Control of the river by Lyon's forces would prevent movement of these companies to the south to join other Confederate troops and sympathizers.
Lyon anticipated that the State forces fleeing west from Jefferson City would eventually turn south. Lyon's Army of the West would pursue them, and trap them in the pincer movement when their southern progress was blocked by the Southwestern Column, which would be waiting south of the Osage River.
The Southwestern Column would include both Volunteers and Home Guards, and was to be commanded by Brigadier General Thomas W. Sweeny. The Column, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, would travel to Rolla by rail, and then to Springfield by road. The first contingent of that column--part of Colonel Francis Sigel's Third Regiment Volunteers--left St. Louis by train that same afternoon (June 11, 1861).
Colonel Sigel was to play an important role in the following few months, and Henry and Philip Landwehr would serve under his command. A small man, now thirty-seven years of age, he had served as Commanding Officer of the German state of Baden in a revolt in 1848. Prior to his service in the Civil War, he was the principal of the German Institute of St. Louis. Although the success of his commands would be inconsistent, he would be a Major General by the end of the war.
Two days after the first contingent left St. Louis, Sigel and the balance of his Third Regiment Volunteers departed by rail for Rolla, accompanied by the guns and caissons of Major Bischoff's six-gun light artillery. On the same day, Lyon departed from St. Louis with a force of about 2,000 men. Carried by four steamboats, the Army of the West proceeded north on the Mississippi to the mouth of the Missouri, and then started up the Missouri River toward Jefferson City.
Two days later, on the 15th, Henry and Philip Landwehr were among the last contingent of the Southwestern Column, as they climbed aboard the train that would take them to Rolla. They were under the command of Colonel Charles E. Salomon. His command included his own Fifth Regiment Volunteers (about 925 men, including Henry and Philip), as well as two regiments of the Home Guards (about 2,000 men). The Home Guards would be assigned the task of patrolling the railroad, and maintaining the safety of the road between Rolla and Springfield against guerrilla attack.
Brigadier General Thomas Sweeny, who was to command the entire Southwestern Column, did not leave St. Louis with his troops. In fact, he would not leave for another two weeks. During those two weeks, Sweeny would work to solve the tremendous logistical problems that faced both Lyon's Army of the West and the Southwestern Column. The Army of the West was traveling light, to enable them to pursue the State troops. Therefore, new provisions would have to be available when they reached Springfield. Once the mountain of supplies that would be needed was collected, the rail line would provide a relatively easy way to transport them to Rolla. But from Rolla to Springfield, it would be a different story. In Rebellion in Missouri: 1861, Hans Christian Adamson describes the situation:
"...the 120-mile stretch between the end of rail at Rolla and the thriving city of Springfield was not worthy of being called a road. It was, rather, a worn, rutty, and rocky trail where horses had to lean hard into their collars to make the wagons roll; where teamsters, time and again, had to lighten loads in order to raise their wheels out of hub-deep depressions."
Brigadier General Sweeny had been advised that the teamsters, wagons, mules, and oxen or heavy draft horses he would need for transport would not be available in either Rolla or Springfield. They would also have to come from St. Louis. Sweeny succeeded in making all of the necessary arrangements before leaving St. Louis for Springfield in late June.
On the same day that Henry and Philip Landwehr left St. Louis by rail, Lyon and his army reached Jefferson City, which they quickly occupied without incident. He had accomplished his first goal without firing a shot. He had chased the State Government out of its capital, forced it into exile, and deprived it of its power to function.
As soon as he arrived in Jefferson City, Lyon received information that armed rebels were preparing fortifications at Boonville, fifty miles upstream. Two days later, on June 17, Lyon and his Army of the West clashed with the Missouri State Guards, commanded by Governor Jackson, at Boonville. The battle was the first real fighting of the Civil War in Missouri. The Union troops routed Jackson's State Guards, and thereby gained control of northern Missouri. From that hour on, the Missouri was a Union river. Governor Jackson first retreated to Tipton, about twenty miles south of Boonville, and then to Warsaw, about forty miles further southwest.
Meanwhile, Missouri State Guard units were recruiting at Lexington, further upstream, and not far east of Kansas City. This recruiting operation was being conducted under the command of Major General Price. When Price received the news that Governor Jackson had retreated toward Warsaw, he left orders for his command to retreat to Lamar, in southwest Missouri, where they would link up with Governor Jackson's forces. Price left at once with his staff and a small escort for Arkansas, in hopes of obtaining assistance from either the Arkansas Governor, or Confederate Brigadier General Ben McCulloch.
Adamson describes Price's ride south from Boonville:
"Paul Revere never rode faster nor shouted his tidings of alarm louder, than did portly "Pap" Price on his long ride from Boonville to Cowskin Prairie. The latter was a stretch of grassland in the extreme southwestern corner of Missouri. Maysville, Arkansas, was some score miles to the south. The nearest city, thriving Neosho, was Newton County's seat.
Price left Lexington with a small escort. By some magic means, seemingly by prairie wireless, the countryside ahead of Price's line of travel heard about his coming. By the pair, by the dozen, by the company--by the hundreds--mounted men joined his informal cavalcade... By the time Price reached Cowskin Prairie, his force amounted to about 1,200 horsemen. The hundreds of eager but horseless men along his route who wanted to fight under the colors of Missouri were informed that Governor Jackson and his generals would soon come marching along. They were warmly invited to join the infantry and to spread the word as far as they could."
Meanwhile, Colonel Sigel was the first of Lyon's officers to arrive in Springfield, on June 23. After organizing his command as rapidly as he could, Sigel headed toward Neosho with his Third Volunteers. Neosho was a hotbed of secessionism, located about sixty miles west-southwest of Springfield, and was the spot that Lyon had selected for the Southwestern Column to wait for Governor Jackson as he fled south, closely pursued by Lyon and his Army of the West.
Colonel Salomon's command, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, reached Springfield on June 27, four days after Colonel Sigel. In the twelve days since they had left St. Louis, they had traveled by rail to Rolla, and then marched to Springfield. Soon after reaching Springfield, Colonel Salomon pushed on west to Neosho, where he joined Colonel Sigel and his men. Sigel informed Salomon that Major General Price and his cavalcade had passed to the south several days earlier. Sigel and Salomon had two choices: they could wait in Neosho, or they could move their forces north, and help Lyon close the pincers on Governor Jackson and his army wherever they met them. Their decision to push north is generally accepted to have been a wise decision, as it would permit the Federal forces to engage Governor Jackson and the State Guards further from the help that might be provided by Confederate forces in northwest Arkansas. Sigel assumed command of the expedition by virtue of his greater military experience.
Meanwhile, Governor Jackson had consolidated the State Guard forces. On July 3, the same day Colonel Sigel and Colonel Salomon started north from Neosho, Governor Jackson and his State Guards camped three miles north of Lamar, and twenty miles north of Carthage. The march south had been accomplished under very difficult conditions, but Jackson was concerned that Lyon would catch up with him before he could link up with Sterling Price and his troops. At roll call on July 3, Jackson's forces consisted of about 2,660 infantry, 1,400 cavalry, and two batteries of artillery. In addition, there were about 2,000 unarmed and unequipped horsemen in camp.
Late in the afternoon of July 4, Sigel's Southwestern Column camped just south of Carthage, only twenty miles south of Governor Jackson's forces. Sigel's troops, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, had just completed a hot and difficult twenty-mile march. As tents were being pitched, and cooking fires lit, Sigel received word that his scouts had encountered some of Governor Jackson's State Guards, who were foraging in Carthage. As soon as their men had eaten, the Southwestern Column moved forward and took possession of Carthage. Sigel and Salomon hoped to march north and catch Governor Jackson off guard early the next morning.
When Governor Jackson first heard that a patrol of Federal troops was approaching Carthage from the south, neither he nor his generals could believe the news. They were concerned about Lyon, who was somewhere behind them, but had no idea that there were any Federal troops to the south. After discussing the situation, a decision was made to march on Carthage at sunrise the next morning.
That night, Henry and Philip Landwehr and their comrades slept on their arms. They were awakened before sunrise the next morning, and fell into ranks without breakfast. Colonel Sigel soon learned that Governor Jackson was marching south from Lamar with 4,000 troops, outnumbering the 1,000 Federal troops four to one. Sigel did not hesitate. Soon after sunrise, the Southwestern Column began marching north to meet Governor Jackson's forces. They had marched nine miles when they sighted Governor Jackson's mounted riflemen and infantry. The balance of Jackson's forces stood in battle formation on the top of a distant ridge.
Governor Jackson's troops watched as Sigel's troops, with their six cannon, forded the Coon Creek, and moved toward them. After crossing the creek, the Federal infantry was deployed into the woods on both the left and right flanks of the artillery. Henry and Philip Landwehr were on the right flank, which was tipped by a six-pounder piece. Adamson describes what happened next:
"As the infantry emerged from the brush, on both sides of the forward moving artillery, it formed into line of battle at a distance of about 1,200 yards from the enemy. Slowly up the slope came the puffy-eyed and sweating Germans. Even this early in the morning, the day was hot for an uphill climb under full combat pack. Suddenly, at 900 yards, there were shouted commands. Bischoff's cannon were swung into line, the Federal infantry (including Henry and Philip Landwehr) slung itself prone on the ground. Then the silence of the morning and the small sounds of the prairie were shattered and drowned out by the short, harsh bark of artillery. The Federals began the firing. The State Guard gave ready answer."
Thirty years later, in his application for a soldier's pension, Henry Landwehr would recall that hot July day near Carthage, and state that:
"he from exposure in camp on guard duty & on the march in extremely hot weather suffered much for want of proper food & water, over-exertion in battles of Carthage & Wilson's Creek, Mo..."
Henry and Philip and their comrades in the infantry watched for nearly an hour, as the artillery battle continued. Sigel then became suspicious that Governor Jackson's troops had begun an encircling movement, and decided to retreat. The long days of drills in the Arsenal at St. Louis paid dividends, as the retreat was well-planned and well-executed, with artillery cover provided to the infantry as they withdrew. Federal casualties were thirteen killed, and thirty-one wounded. Missouri State Guard casualties were ten killed, and sixty-four wounded.
Adamson comments on the Federal tactics at the Battle of Carthage:
"Just why Sigel and Salomon undertook to charge up a hill against Jackson and such overwhelming numerical odds has never been explained. They were inferior in gunpower as well as rifle fire and they lacked the highly essential element of cavalry. It could, of course, be that they made the grave error of under-estimating the natural fighting instinct of Missourians. Their own soldiers may have been better trained, but the weight of numbers--rolling down hill--gave Jackson a clear-cut advantage and he made the most of it."
Henry and Philip and their comrades retreated to Carthage. After a pause of several hours, they marched east to Sarcoxie, arriving there at four o'clock in the morning. In the last twenty-four hours, they had not only tangled with the State Guard--they had also marched thirty-four miles without anything to eat. From Sarcoxie, they marched to Mount Vernon, and finally back to Springfield. With Sigel's defeat at Carthage, Lyon's plan to trap Governor Jackson's forces in a pincer movement had failed.
As it turned out, Governor Jackson need not have been concerned that Lyon and his Army of the West would catch up with Jackson's Missouri State Guards. The task of assembling a transport train to accompany his army south proved to be much more difficult than Lyon and his officers had anticipated. Sixteen days passed from the day that Lyon took Boonville until his army left Boonville to march south. Lyon's army finally left Boonville just two days before the Battle of Carthage.
After a difficult ten-day march, Lyon and his troops reached Springfield, a bustling boomtown of 2,000 souls, on July 13. There, the Army of the West and the Southwestern Column were reunited. But, soon after his arrival, Lyon learned of a serious logistical problem. Lyon expected to find mountains of supplies, including weapons, ammunition, clothing, and food, awaiting him in Springfield. Some of the supplies had reached Rolla, but none had been transported to Springfield. Lyon could not have anticipated the actions of a petty Quartermaster in St. Louis. Jealous of Lyon's rapid rise to command, the Quartermaster cancelled all of the supply arrangements that Brigadier General Sweeny had made, as soon as Sweeny left St. Louis. Acting our of sheer malice toward Lyon, the Quartermaster endangered the entire Federal expedition.
As Lyon analyzed his troop strength, he found that his entire command, not including Home Guards, numbered only about 6,000 potential effectives. In addition, he commanded about 1,200 Home Guards in Springfield and vicinity, who were being organized and armed. On the other hand, reports reaching Lyon indicated that Major General Price's enemy troop strength had rapidly grown to 30,000. And if that weren't enough, Lyon received rumors that Governor Jackson was making arrangements for help from Confederate armies in Tennessee and Arkansas.
The outlook appeared bleak. Lyon needed to strike at the Missouri forces before they were able to train and equip all their new recruits. But the lack of supplies, particularly shoes, prevented an early offensive by Lyon.
Lyon was also faced with another problem. Henry and Philip Landwehr, and all of the other Volunteers and Home Guards who responded to President Lincoln's April proclamation, were only enlisted for ninety days. Most of Lyon's troops enlisted during late April and early May. In another week or two, their ninety-day enlistment periods would begin to expire. While the Army could accept volunteers who sought to re-enlist of their own free will, no soldier could be prevented from going home after his three months were up. Unless something could be done, Lyon's troop strength by the end of July would be reduced to three regiments of Volunteer infantry and artillery, plus about 1,000 regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
Adamson describes Lyon's approach to the problem:
"All company officers were urged to familiarize themselves with the attitudes of the men within their respective companies as regards further service and to urge them to re-enlist. When asked to state their views, the great majority of captains and lieutenants who spoke up declared that the men could take hunger and hardship in their stride. But waves of disappointemnt had swept over the organizations when they found that neither clothing replacements, provisions, nor pay awaited them in Springfield. None of them had seen the color of Uncle Sam's money since the very day they put on uniforms."
The troops of Lyon's Army of the West were exhausted from their difficult march from Boonville, as were those animals of his transport train which survived the journey. Nevertheless, Lyon ordered that a wagon train be assembled to leave as early as possible for Rolla, and to return with as heavy a load of supplies as the animals could haul.
According to Adamson, Nathaniel Lyon sent the following message that same afternoon to the Adjutant General in St. Louis:
"All idea of any further movement, or even maintaining our present position, must soon be abandoned unless the Government furnishes us promptly with large reinforcements and supplies.
Our troops are badly clothed, poorly fed and imperfectly supplied with tents. None of them have as yet been paid and three months volunteers have become disheartened to such an extent that very few of them are willing to renew their enlistments."
Lyon felt that his only chance was to obtain reinforcements before the end of the month, so that he could attack Price at Cowskin Prairie during the last week of July, before he lost too many of his troops due to expiration of their ninety-day enlistments.
During the next three weeks, Lyon's forces would remain encamped at Springfield, waiting for the supplies and reinforcements they desperately needed. He also had to fight a War Department that wanted him to send his Regular infantry and cavalry back to Washington.
While Lyon waited, more bad news arrived. Adamson describes the news and the results:
"Then, on July 26, came the paralyzing news of the overwhelming Confederate victory in the Battle of Bull Run. In pro-Southern states, jubilation ran high and served as a builder of confidence. Southwestern Missouri, with its growing rural population, was held together by strong Southern ties. The rural counties shook with surges of rambunctious and vociferous enthusiasm. Men and boys, who until now had been uncertain about joining up, flocked to Cowskin Prairie to get into the fray, join the Dutch hunt, and kill themselves a few Yankees while the going was good. Everybody knew that this was going to be a short war. Price became more audacious. Heavily armed foraging parties would come within a few miles of Springfield, raid Unionist farms, burn homes, barns, and smokehouses."
On the same day that news of the Battle of Bull Run was received by Lyon, Major General John Charles Fremont arrived in St. Louis to take command of the new Western Department. Unfortunately, Fremont was a poor choice for the command, and he virtually ignored Lyon's pleas for assistance, as he gave his attention to other matters.
Meanwhile, Major General Price was successfully training and equipping his rebel army at Cowskin Prairie. They struck camp on July 24, and arrived in Cassville, fifty miles southwest of Springfield, three days later. There, they were joined by another 650 State Guard troops, and by 5,000 well-armed Confederate troops. The rebel armies at Cassville now numbered 12,000, plus another 2,000 unarmed Missourians.
Price and the other commanders of the rebel army were now ready to attack Lyon, and began their march on Springfield on August 1. Lyon soon learned that the enemy was approaching, but was in a poor position to react. He was continuing to lose men as their ninety-day enlistments expired, he had received no reinforcements from St. Louis, and the wagon train of supplies had not yet returned from Rolla. Because of inadequate food, many of his troops were wasting from privation. They needed clothes, and large numbers of them were entirely without shoes.
Henry and Philip were apparently among the troops whose enlistment expired that day. In his later report of the upcoming Battle of Wilson's Creek, Colonel Sigel wrote:
"The time of service of the Fifth Regiment Missouri Volunteers had expired before the battle. I had induced them, company by company, not to leave us in the most critical and dangerous moment, and had engaged them for the time of eight days, this term ending on Friday, the 9th, the day before the battle."
Thus, Henry and Philip Landwehr agreed to stay for the upcoming battle.
Lyon and his officers knew that Springfield could not be defended. They felt they could scrape together three days of field rations. They decided to gamble, and engage the enemy within two days march of Springfield. That same day, on August 1, they moved their army, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, twelve miles south of Springfield, to the point where Terrell Creek empties into Wilson's Creek.
On the 2nd and 3rd of August, there were skirmishes between units of the opposing armies near Dug Springs, but no major battles. Price's forces could not mount a full-scale attack on Lyon because of disputes over command of the Missouri, Arkansas, and Confederate armies. By the time that their differences were resolved, and they began to move their 15,000 troops against Lyon's 5,000 troops early on August 5, they discovered that Lyon had fallen back to Springfield. The rebel forces, now under the command of Brigadier General Ben McCulloch, camped that night on Wilson's Creek, south of Springfield.
On his return to Springfield, Lyon received both bad news and good news. There was still no reason to be optimistic that Fremont would provide replacements. But, the wagon train had finally returned from Rolla, with food, clothing, and shoes. Distribution of the supplies did wonders for the fighting spirit of the troops.
On the afternoon of August 8, Lyon called his officers together to discuss their next move. There was agreement that Springfield could not be defended. They could not stay there and wait for the enemy to attack. There was strong support for a retreat to Rolla. But there was concern that the enemy could easily turn such a retreat into a rout. The only other alternative was to attack.
The next day, on August 9, Lyon made his decision. They would attack the enemy, and hopefully inflict enough damage to prevent the enemy from disrupting a subsequent retreat to Rolla. Plans were made to march on the enemy that night, and to attack at dawn the next morning. As plans were being made, Sigel proposed that he take his brigade, consisting of infantry (including Henry and Philip), cavalry, and six pieces of artillery, south of the enemy camp, while Lyon's main force would attack from the north.
Sigel's proposal was opposed, and was not adopted, but Sigel met with Lyon again later in the morning, and Sigel's proposal was incorporated into the battle plan. Colonel Sigel would move his 1,200 troops, who would be known as the South Column, at six o'clock that evening. He was to time his arrival at Wilson's Creek so that he would round the enemy's right flank at daylight, and be in a position to attack when Lyon began his attack from the north. The North Column, consisting of 3,600 men commanded by Lyon, would march westward during the night, reach and round the enemy's left flank by daybreak, and then launch the attack. They would strike a paralyzing blow against the enemy, then make a speedy withdrawal to Rolla before the enemy could recover enough to prevent their retreat.
Meanwhile, the rebel commanders were also making plans. While their decision-making had been slowed by General McCulloch's lack of confidence in Major General Price's State Guard, a decision had been reached. They would attack Lyon at Springfield on the morning of August 10, the very same time that Lyon was planning to attack McCulloch's forces at Wilson's Creek! But a problem arose at the last minute. The Missouri State Guards had no cartridge boxes. Instead, they carried their cartridges in cotton bags which they hung around their necks. The cotton bags provided little protection against a hard rain, such as the rain which began to fall as they prepared to march. Because their firepower would have been substantially reduced by the effect of the rain, the attack on Lyon's army was postponed.
There are a number of good books which describe the Battle of Wilson's Creek in detail. Adamson's Rebellion in Missouri: 1861 is one. We will not attempt to describe details of the entire battle here, but will summarize the actions which involved Henry and Philip Landwehr.
Adamson describes Sigel's movements as he positioned his troops, including Henry and Philip, for battle:
"Sigel moved out of camp at 6:30 o'clock and headed down the Springfield Road toward Wilson's Creek for a distance of some four miles. The night was dark and it was raining. Presently, however, the downpour died into a drizzle. From the highway, the column swung straight south over open county. The guides, and Captain Carr's First Cavalry company, had the lead. It required great caution for the vanguard not to lose its way or not to get separated from the main body. Carr's orders were to pick up and hold any person they might come upon; this to prevent information from reaching the enemy.
After trudging some five hours over muddy and rain-sodden country, at the end of which both men and animals were approaching exhaustion, the column rested in a glade of trees, protected from the rain. No fires were lit and all sounds were held at a minimum. At 2 o'clock in the morning, the march was resumed. Nothing untoward occurred during the next two hours. In time the column reached, as expected, the wagon road that crossed Wilson's Creek a short distance to the westward.
Signs that they were approaching the enemy camp appeared about 4 o'clock when, in the lingering darkness, foragers were met going into the surrounding country from the camp. Some 40 were captured by Captain Carr's cavalrymen before they could make outcry or flee.
One of the prisoners said that they were expecting reinforcements from Louisiana and that they had mistaken Carr's cavalry for the reinforcements. In the dark of that morning, Federal coats looked gray.
At about 4:30 o'clock, Colonel Sigel took Lieutenant Farrand and his dragoons to the head of the column and placed his two companies of horsemen ahead and on his flanks. Soon Farrand discovered a small party of men and horses in a ravine--evidently pickets. The men saw him, too, mounted their animals and rode off. Farrand did not capture them but he reported with satisfaction that he had cut them off from their camp. The latter was now in full view, slightly ahead, but mainly on the right.
Luckily for Sigel, at this point the road entered the incline of a ravine. Its walls sheltered his troops from sight. As Sigel held his force briefly under this cover, Carr conducted a swift reconnaissance. It revealed that Wilson's Creek was just ahead and that a large force of rebel cavalry--Churchill, Major, Brown, and Greer--was encamped upstream in Sharp's field on the west bank. Carr also reported that a bluff on the east bank overlooked the site and was a natural selection for the emplacement of cannon. Leaving Carr with his cavalry and an infantry support of several companies as their protective shield, two cannon, under Lieutenant Schuetzenbach, were planted near the edge of the bluff. He was ordered not to discharge a shot until he heard Sigel's fire. Then his guns were to hurl several salvos of canister and shell in among the horsemen who were tending to their animals or preparing breakfast. Carr's position was well sheltered by a curtain of tall weeds.
The rest of Sigel's force crossed Wilson's Creek near Dixon's homestead. Following a rough cattle trail through a thickly wooded area, the column halted when scouts reported sighting the rebel cavalry camp through the edge of the trees.
For Sigel, there was now nothing to do but wait until he heard the opening shots of Nathaniel Lyon's attack from the direction of Oak Hill. The first part of his mission had been performed smoothly and without opposition."
Colonel Sigel waited impatiently for the roar of artillery that would signal the attack by Lyon. His troops were near enough to the rebel camp to hear the men and horses, and to smell their cooking fires. As soon as Sigel heard the roar of distant cannon, he unleashed his six cannon on the surprised rebel cavalry camp below. Their aim was poor, and most of the missiles crashed harmlessly in the woods. Nevertheless, the rebel cavalry was routed from their camp. Henry and Philip Landwehr would have been among the infantry that moved into the enemy camp unopposed. Lieutenant Farrand reported the scene as they entered the deserted rebel camp:
"As we passed through it, I saw many dead bodies and quantities of arms of all description lying on the ground. Many of the latter I caused my men to destroy. There were in their camp a wagon load of Maynard rifles, one of regular rifled muskets, and several boxes of U. S. regulation sabers, all new."
Colonel Sigel thought that the cavalrymen he had driven out of the camp had left the battle scene as they sought escape. But the main battle between the rebels and Lyon's forces to the north had blocked their escape route, and they had reorganized for a counterattack. Captain Carr saw the cavalrymen reorganizing from his vantage point on the bluff, and sent word to Sigel, now in the center of the enemy camp. Sigel just had time to prepare his infantry and artillery for an attack, when the cavalry swept down upon them. Sigel's artillery were extremely effective, and with the support of Henry and Philip and the rest of the infantrymen, the attacking cavalry were quickly driven back.
Sigel's troops, now successful for a second time, broke ranks, and started to pillage the enemy's tents, and set out to capture and appropriate his horses. But the looting was soon brought to an abrupt halt by artillery shot and solid shells which began to rain down upon the looters from an Arkansas battery on a nearby bluff. Sigel's men were driven into the woods west of the field.
A wagon road ran in a northerly direction along the field Sigel's troops had just vacated. Sigel learned that it joined the Springfield Road just west of Sharp's farm. His thoughts turned to the most important task assigned to him--cutting off the enemy's escape route to the south. Sigel described his next move:
"Marching forward, on the wagon road, we struck the Springfield Road, making our way through a large number of cattle and horses, until we arrived on an eminence used as a slaughtering place and known as Sharp's farm. On our route, we had taken about 100 prisoners who were scattered all over the camp. At Sharp's place, we met numbers of the enemy's soldiers who were evidently retiring in this direction and, as I suspected that the enemy, on his retreat, would follow in the same direction, I formed the troops across the road, by planting the artillery on the plateau and the two infantry regiments on the right and left across the road, while the cavalry companies, extended on our flanks.
At this time, and after some skirmishing along the front of our line, the firing in the direction of our northwest, which was during an hour's time roaring in succession, had almost ceased. I, thereupon, presumed that the attack of General Lyon had been successful, and that his troops were in pursuit of the enemy, who moved in large numbers toward the south along the ridge of a hill about 700 yards opposite our right."
It was now 8:30, about three hours since Sigel's artillery began shelling the rebel cavalry camp. Henry and Philip Landwehr, along with the rest of Sigel's infantry, were straddling the Springfield Road, waiting for Lyon's victorious troops to come down the road. But Confederate General McCulloch was quickly informed of Sigel's employment of artillery across the Springfield Road, and decided to attack it head-on with a battalion of dismounted First Arkansas Mounted Riflemen, a battalion of Louisiana Infantry, and an artillery battery.
The use of blue and gray material for uniforms of the two armies was not yet established as a standard at this early point in the war. And the Louisiana Infantry regiment approaching Sigel's position wore uniforms of blue gray--very nearly the same color as those of an Iowa regiment who made up part of Lyon's forces. Colonel Sigel describes what happened:
"This was the state of affairs at half-past eight o'clock in the morning, when it was reported to me by Dr. Melchior, and some of our skirmishers, that "Lyon's men were coming up the road."
Lieutenant-Colonel Albert, of the Third, and Colonel Salomon, of the Fifth, notified their regiments not to fire on troops coming in this direction, while I cautioned the artillery in the same manner.
Our troops in this moment expected, with anxiety, the approach of their friends, and were waving the flag, raised as a signal to their comrades, when at once two batteries opened their fire against us, one in front, placed on the Springfield Road, and the other upon the hill (eastern bluff) upon which we had supposed Lyon's forces were in pursuit of the enemy, while a strong column of infantry, supposed to be the Iowa regiment, advanced on the road, up the hill, and attacked our right.
It is impossible for me to describe the confusion and frightful consternation which was occasioned by this important event. The cry, "They (Lyon's troops) are firing against us," spread like wildfire through our ranks; the artillery men, ordered to fire, and directed by myself, could hardly be brought forward to serve their pieces; the infantry would not level their arms until it was too late. The enemy arrived within 10 paces of the muzzles of our cannon, killed the horses, turned the ranks of the infantry and forced them to fly. The troops were throwing themselves into the bushes and by-roads, retreating as well as they could, followed and attacked incessantly by large bodies of Arkansas and Texas Cavalry."
Sigel's infantry and artillerists, including Henry and Philip Landwehr, were routed. At least one of Sigel's officers, 2nd Lieutenant Emile Thomas of Company F, 5th Missouri (the Company of Henry and Philip Landwehr), tried to rally his panic-stricken men. Suddenly, a mounted Confederate battalion cut across the Union line of retreat. For a moment the two commands gazed at each other. Then, according to a man on the scene:
"...came a terrible rattle of musketry, and a great hubbub and confusion in the direction of Sigel's command, which was just around a bend in the road, to our rear.
In a twinkling, men, horses, wagons, guns, all enveloped in a cloud of dust, rushed toward us, and in spite of Lieut. Thomas' utmost efforts, Company F started with all speed down the (Telegraph) road toward the Confederate cavalry. The latter, seeming to think that they were being charged upon, wheeled and got out of the way very quickly!"
Sigel's column was now divided. The Fifth Regiment, which had included Henry and Philip, retreated by way of the Telegraph road, accompanied by Colonel Salomon. The Third Regiment, accompanied by Colonel Sigel, withdrew down the road along which the brigade had approached the Sharp house.
Reports indicate that Salomon's Fifth Regiment reached the Little York road, and returned to Springfield without further incident. Sigel was not so lucky. He, with about 400 men and one gun, were overtaken and attacked at the James River. Sigel's men scattered into the surrounding woods, and a running fight ensued. Before it was over, the Southerners had killed, captured, or wounded the greater part of Sigel's command. A southern Colonel reported killing 64 and capturing 147 of Sigel's men.
Philip Landwehr was among those fortunate troops who escaped without serious injury. Henry was not so fortunate. He was captured, and taken prisoner, by the Confederate troops. A family story recalled by Everett Bromelsick, a grandson of Henry's brother William, suggests that Henry was taken prisoner along with six of his comrades. It must have been a fearful experience. Henry would not have known any English, so couldn't have communicated with his captors, but would certainly have been aware of how strongly the enemy hated the "damned Dutch".
With Sigel's threat to the rear eliminated, General McCulloch was able to concentrate his troops and artillery against Lyon's main force. The battle raged on for most of the morning. It was hard-fought, at close range, with the hardest fighting in the Battle of Bloody Hill. General Lyon, considered by many historians as destined for greatness, died in battle at mid-morning. The battle finally ended about 11:30. Both sides claimed victory, and both paid a dear price. The casualty rate would be the highest of any major battle in the bloody Civil War.
While the battle between Lyon's column and the rebel armies raged on, Sigel's troops concentrated on avoiding the enemy, and making their way back to Springfield, twelve miles to the north. Colonel Sigel escaped the attack that completed the rout of his command, although he and a companion were chased on horseback for six miles by Confederate horsemen. Sigel and his companion arrived back in Springfield about 4:30 in the afternoon. Sigel's men would continue to straggle into camp throughout the day, and into the night. Of the 1,123 men under Sigel's command that day, an official report listed 35 killed, 132 wounded, and 130 missing. Confederate soldiers would later gather around campfires in the evening and sing of the Battle of Wilson's Creek:
Old Sigel fought some on that day,
But lost his army in the fray;
Then off to Springfield he did run,
With two Dutch guards, and nary gun.
When Philip applied for a military pension thirty years later, one of his affidavits touched on the events of August 10. His affidavit was apparently in reply to a question from the War Department regarding an injury he claimed he had suffered to his forehead. Philip's affidavit stated:
"That he (Philip) can not furnish the affidavits of two persons who wher pressent, at the time of his injury in forehead at the Battle of Wilson Creek Mo on the 10th day of August 1861 for following reason and circumstances. that when he was ordered on a double quick march down a rockey hill in said battle and fell with his head, on a sharp rock his Company where all scatered and no one saw him receive said injury, and when he got to the Company again that night he can not remember, who saw his wound exept four or Five Comrades and they are all dead so he is informed and he says that he had just come from Germany & could not speak the English language..."
It would seem unlikely that Philip was aware of the fate of his older brother. How worried he must have been when he reached camp in Springfield, and found that Henry had not returned! It may have been some time before he learned that Henry was a prisoner of war.
When the returning Federal troops reached Springfield, they found the town in turmoil, as both the streets and the road to Rolla were choked by fleeing citizens. Command of the Federal troops was turned over to Sigel, who was the senior officer in command. One of the Federal officers, Major Schofield, later reported the events that followed:
"On our return to Springfield, at about 5 o'clock p.m., Major Sturgis yielded the command to Colonel Sigel, and the latter, after consultation with many of the officers of the army, decided to retreat toward Rolla; starting at 2 o'clock a.m., in order that the column might be in favorable position for defense before daylight. At the hour appointed for the troops to move I found Colonel Sigel asleep in bed, and his own brigade, which was to be the advance guard, making preparations to cook their breakfast. It was 4 o'clock before I could get them started. Sigel remained in command three days, kept his two regiments in front all the time, made little more than ordinary day's marches, but yet did not get in camp till 10 and one occasion 12 o'clock at night. On the second day he kept the main column waiting, exposed to the sun on a dry prairie, while his own men killed beef and cooked their breakfast. They finished their breakfast at about noon, and then began their day's march.
The fatigue and annoyance to the troops soon became so intolerable that discipline was impossible. The officers, therefore, almost unanimously demanded a change. Major Sturgis, in compliance with the demand, assumed the command."
As Philip made the long, hard march from Springfield back to Rolla, he must have worried about the fate of his brother. Everett Bromelsick's recollection of a family story provides our only information about Henry's captivity. According to the family story, Henry and his comrades were "put in a place no better than a hog pen. All they had to eat were green roasting ears and green apples thrown to them." There are reasons to believe that this description of their treatment was relatively accurate. The rebels, themselves, had little food other than what they could find in the area where they were encamped. Roasting ears were a primary staple of the rebel soldiers who fought at Wilson's Creek. And this description of the treatment given to German soldiers captured by Confederate forces closely matches other documented accounts.
On August 15, five days after the battle, Confederate Brigadier General McCulloch issued a Proclamation to the People of Missouri. In that proclamation, McCulloch announced that "prisoners of the Union party who have been arrested by the army will be released and allowed to return to their friends." Shortly thereafter, Henry Landwehr was parolled (released after signing an oath that he would not again take up arms against the Confederacy), and probably returned to St. Louis with his fellow prisoners.
On August 19, nine days after the battle, Philip Landwehr and the rest of the Army of the West reached Rolla. Philip's regiment arrived in St. Louis two days later, and was mustered out on August 27.
